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Reducing Risk in PublicPrivate Partnership Contracts:
Two Examples From Highway
Tolling Projects
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ABSTRACT
In an effort to address financial constraints and environmental concerns states
have increasingly turned to a combination of un-tolled (HOV) and tolled (HOT)
lanes. Public-private partnerships (3Ps) are a popular mechanism for this more
sustainable approach to highway infrastructure that couples environmental
sustainability (efficient utilization of existing lanes, less congestion) with financial
sustainability (private investment). This chapter offers an approach to 3P contract
writing for HOV/HOT facilities that is structured by a stakeholder analysis of actors
in the project accountability environment. By analyzing two Virginia 3P highway
projects, the chapter shows it is possible to build into a contract a set of terms and
conditions to enhance the likelihood of meeting the goals of multiple stakeholders.
By necessity, such contracts cannot specify precise monetary returns and other
stakeholder benefits, but they can be written to include trade-offs to minimize losses
to one party at the expense of another.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-7396-8.ch008
Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial constraints and environmental concerns are promoting the development
of tolled highway projects that encourage less driving with a combination of (untolled) high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes and high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes.
HOV/HOT projects are financially sustainable when the private sector is a partner
who invests money in the project. The projects are environmentally sustainable
when they add fewer lane miles of pavement than a traditional roadway expansion,
consume less land, and offer drivers a choice between un-tolled lanes and a tolled
lane that is faster and less congested.
Public-private partnerships (3Ps) are a popular mechanism for this more
sustainable approach to new highway infrastructure. However, many 3Ps are riskprone due to their complexity and the unpredictable nature of the revenue streams
they frequently create (Urban Land Institute, 2013). The risks and uncertainties
challenge accountability. This is especially the case when public infrastructure
investments assume adequate returns to the parties over an extended time horizon
(Hodge, 2004). Given the ambiguity of future events, it is impossible to specify all
the desired results in the contract. Thus, it is difficult for the parties to hold each
accountable for any failure to deliver. In this regard, 3Ps to build tolled facilities
can subvert the conventional approach to accountability and fail to generate the
expected financial and environmental benefits.
Public and private sector actors thus may face the prospect of a failed project.
Farmer (2018) provides a classic example of a local government suffering a substantial
loss from a poorly designed contract with the private sector. The City of St. Louis
lost money when its NFL team, the Rams, moved to Los Angeles. The Rams owners
used a loophole in their contract with the St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports
Complex Authority to avoid paying the rest of the Rams’ share of the $259 million,
30-year bond used to finance the construction of a football stadium (Farmer, 2018).
The Rams were able to leave the taxpayers on the hook for the remaining financial
obligation because in its leasing agreement with the team, St. Louis officials agreed
that the new stadium would remain rated in the top 25 percent of all NFL stadiums.
When the financially-strapped city refused to make the stadium upgrades to keep it
in the top 25 percent, the team’s lease was not renewed. St. Louis officials made a
simple error—they did not stipulate in the contract that the team must continue to
lease the stadium so long as any of the debt remained outstanding.
This chapter offers an approach to 3P contract writing for HOV/HOT facilities
that is structured by a stakeholder analysis of the interests of all the actors in the
accountability environment surrounding a project’s field. Rather than specifying
precise outcomes of the highway projects, the contracts analyzed were strategically
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designed to reduce risk by setting up a range of potential outcomes to increase the
likelihood that all stakeholders in the project’s field benefit. This can be viewed
as a type of emergent accountability in that the contract contains mechanisms
that adjust outcomes to minimize the prospect of extreme gains and losses by the
interested parties.
The objective of this chapter is to show that it is possible to build into a 3P
contract a set of terms and conditions to enhance the likelihood of meeting the
goals of multiple stakeholders. By necessity, such contracts cannot specify precise
monetary returns and other stakeholder benefits. They can, however, be written to
include trade-offs to minimize losses to one party at the expense of another. This
can be done, in part, by taking into account conditions that could lead to a one-sided
distribution of outcomes.
The chapter begins by discussing advantages of a stakeholder approach to
devising contracts for multi-sectoral public-private partnerships. This is followed by
a description of the frequent elements of two common accountability environments.
The authors then describe two Virginia highway projects, highlighting the risks
involved. The contracts are then analyzed with a focus on the techniques deployed
to foster accountability to all stakeholders when the ultimate distribution of gains
and losses from tolling is unpredictable.

BACKGROUND
State Transportation Agencies, Privatization,
and Public-Private Partnerships
As Yusuf and O’Connell (2014) note, local and state governments are increasingly
forming partnerships with the private sector to provide transportation infrastructure in
an effort to address expanding needs under the constraint of limited public resources.
In the transportation arena, growing privatization has many roots, including shortages
of government personnel and the resulting lack of expertise in the public sector,
expansion of demand for transportation services and infrastructure, and pressures to
reduce costs and improve quality (Gen & Kingsley, 2007; Ponomariov & Kingsley,
2008; Warne, 2003; Yusuf & O’Connell, 2014).
As of 2016, 34 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had enabling
legislation allowing them to enter into 3Ps (Slone, 2016). From the late 1980s
through 2013, the number of transportation-related 3Ps has steadily grown (Z. Chen,
Daito, & Gifford, 2014). The popularity of 3Ps can be attributed to many factors,
including innovation and new technology emanating from the private sector, the
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need for private sector expertise, and especially the potential for private funding for
transportation infrastructure and services.
While the opportunity for successful public-private partnerships is great, it is
certainly not without risk (Urban Land Institute, 2013). Public officials are accountable
to many stakeholders and 3Ps can exacerbate accountability challenges (Yusuf &
Leavitt, 2014). Moreover, the accountability challenge is multidimensional, especially
when the contract extends over many years (Hodge 2004; Grimsey and Lewis 2001).
Roumboutsos and Pantelias (2015) note that 3Ps “are not actual ‘partnerships’, but
strict legal transactions where all parties are contractually bound into delivering
their own part in the project under detailed specifications and requirements” (p.
186). As such, contracts for long-term 3Ps must address a variety of potential risks,
among them engineering and design failures, poor construction, expensive delays,
maintenance failures, revenue shortfalls, funding risks, environmental issues, changes
in government policies, and possible project default (Grimsey and Lewis 2001).
As contracts lengthen unforeseen challenges to project success can mount (Hodge
2004). This places a premium on the creation of contract terms that build in flexibility
over the course of the contract and a willingness to negotiate changes in partner
expectations for results. We view the willingness to negotiate these changes as an
emergent form of accountability in which outcomes for partners can evolve with
changing circumstances. In this regard, contracts assume good faith collaboration
among partners who cooperate with each other to create mutually acceptable solutions
to the problems that arise (Willems, Verhoest, Voets, Copperns, Van Dooren, and Van
den Hurk 2016). Contracts can be structured in ways to encourage creative responses
to potential contingencies. A degree of flexibility can be built into contracts, for
instance, some contracts call for a resort to third parties to provide dispute resolution
to enable adjustments in fees and revenue allocation. (Shrestha, Chan, Aibinu and
Chen 2017). Awareness of the need to respond to changing conditions has led to
the elimination from many contracts of the non-competition clauses that prevented
governments from building new facilities in the same geographic area in subsequent
years (Siemiatycki 2009).
For successful 3Ps, Little (2011) contends, the various project risks should be
“transparently identified, equitably allocated, and costed appropriately” (p. 246).
Political risks, which could include cancellation of the concession or the introduction
of regulatory policies, should be borne by the state. The private partner should be
expected to control construction risks (e.g., incorrect or inappropriate design, project
delays, etc.) and operation and maintenance risks (e.g., physical condition of the
facility, poor construction quality, etc.). If income risk or any risks that would reduce
use or profitability is to be held by the private contractor, careful consideration of
usage and revenue projections should be addressed in the contract (Little, 2011).
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We focus on the terms in the contracts that facilitate negotiation and mutual
adjustment. We show that the parties had to build terms into the HOV/HOT contracts
that facilitated working together to reach the twin goals of maintaining a smooth
traffic flow while providing a profitable revenue stream. The greatest risk for the
state was a possible failure to maintain the desired level of traffic flow; for the private
sector firm a failure to maintain a profitable income stream.

Congestion and HOV/HOT Projects
With rising vehicle ownership in the U.S., traffic congestion has become a major
threat to the quality of urban life. According to the American Society of Civil
Engineers (2017), more than 40% of the country’s major urban highways are
congested, costing, in 2014, an estimated $160 billion in wasted time and fuel,
6.9 billion hours in traffic delays (42 hours per driver) and 3.1 billion gallons of
gasoline. From 2013 to 2014, 95% of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S.,
had increased traffic congestion.
More lane miles are needed to reduce congestion but budgetary shortfalls persist.
In response, states and localities have begun implementing creative strategies
aimed at reducing congestion while simultaneously raising roadway funds. Policy
makers are increasingly turning over the responsibilities for roadway management
and upkeep to private companies even though this has produced mixed results
(Boarnet & Dimento, 2004). Another common approach has been to increase the
use of variable rate tolling on specifically designated HOV/HOT lanes (Copeland
& Overberg, 2012). HOV/HOT lanes give drivers a choice. Drivers can car pool or
pay a toll to use the less congested toll lane or they can avoid the toll by driving in
the un-tolled lane(s).
HOV lanes are designed to encourage carpooling and, in turn, ease congestion
and roadway stress, but the effectiveness of HOV lanes at addressing congestion
has been limited. Research finds that HOV lanes are typically underused with little
ameliorative impact on either congestion or the environment (Poole Jr & Orski,
2000; Safirova, Gillingham, Harrington, & Nelson, 2003).
As the questionable impact of HOV lanes has become increasingly clear, many
states have started converting existing HOV lanes to HOT lanes (Poole Jr & Orski,
2000). HOT lanes can charge a set fee or charge variable fees based on congestion
at a given time throughout the day. Variable fees maintain the smooth flow of traffic
in the toll lanes by raising fees when traffic volumes increase and, conversely,
lowering fees when traffic volumes decrease.(Copeland & Overberg, 2012). The
basic premise of variable rate fees is that some people are willing to pay higher rates
to avoid peak-time congestion.
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In addition to controlling and limiting congestion, HOT lanes also generate
higher toll revenues and often eliminate the need for new or additional roadway
construction (Transcore, 2009). Perhaps, more importantly to drivers, HOT lanes
typically offer the added peace of mind of predictable travel times (Harlow, 2013).
While many HOV lane structures have begun full conversions to HOT lanes, a
significant number of federal roadways have begun incorporating both the HOT and
HOV lanes together in unison (Perez, Batac, & Vovsha, 2012). One of the reasons for
the combination is the federal government’s regulations regarding tolling on federal
roadways. By combining HOT lanes with existing HOV lanes, the government is
able to retain the integrity of the HOV system, while generating additional revenue
through additional HOT lane use by toll paying single occupant drivers (Perez et
al., 2012). The benefits to this approach are many. In addition to the much needed
revenue generated by HOT lane users, the typically underutilized HOV lanes receive
increased traffic and usage, which in turn decreases overall congestion for all roadway
users (Safirova et al., 2003).

The Stakeholder Approach to Public-Private
Partnerships and Accountability
The perspectives of different stakeholders are important in considering 3Ps, since
3Ps are generally long-term partnership between two stakeholder groups - the public
agency and the private firm – with implications for a third category of stakeholders
– users and the general public (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010; Grossi &
Thomasson, 2015; Liyanage & Villalba-Romero, 2015).
For transportation agencies, accountability to the public is a critical aspect of
3Ps (Forrer et al., 2010; Wu, Liu, Jin, & Sing, 2016). The delegation of authority
to nongovernmental entities (i.e., private firms) can lead to the potential loss of
legitimacy, since the former government function is now accomplished indirectly
and at arms’ length. However, while government agencies can transfer power to the
private sector, they cannot transfer legitimacy and accountability in the same way.
3Ps change the venue within which transportation infrastructure and services are
delivered; but they do not eliminate the transportation agency’s responsibility to the
public. 3Ps can only work well if the government agency manages the partnership
effectively and ensures continued private partner accountability (Hodge & Greve,
2017; Milward & Provan, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; Skelcher, 2010).
Kearns (1996) coined the term ‘accountability environment’ to capture the
complex nature of the public’s search for accountable governance. Accountability
frequently emerges from the interplay of the multiple actors who can be said to
comprise the organizational environment or ‘field.’ Besides the focal organization,

179

Reducing Risk in Public-Private Partnership Contracts

the field includes the external organizations and interested parties with a stake in
the focal organization’s activities. In the transportation arena, state transportation
agencies (i.e., state Departments of Transportation, DOTs) must manage complex
stakeholder relations (O’Connell, Yusuf, & Hackbart, 2009; Yusuf, O’Connell,
Hackbart, & Wallace, 2008) that have increasingly been marked by contracting and
partnerships (Lockwood, 1998; Warne, 2003)
Accountability is a multidimensional product of the stakeholders operating in the
accountability environment (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Hult & Walcott, 1990; O’Connell,
2005, 2006), and, therefore, as O’Connell et al. suggest, accountability in multiparty
situations results “from negotiations between the parties that share powers” (2009,
p. 410). When forging a contract for a 3P transportation project the stakeholders
include, among others, the state DOT, the road builder, environmentalists, drivers,
local residents, taxpayers, and elected officials.
A public-private partnership is a collaboration involving actors and/or funding
from the public sector on the one hand and the private sector on the other. It is a
contractual agreement between the public sector and a private partner “wherein
the private sector, in exchange for compensation, agrees to deliver facilities and/
or services that have been or could be provided by the public sector” (Little, 2011,
p. 243). The private sector contributes resources and expertise, and has a fiscal
incentive to maintain efficient management of the roadway (Krol, 2016; van Den
Hurk & Verhoest, 2017). As a jointly developed endeavor, costs, risks, rewards,
and resources can be shared in a variety of ways as stipulated in the contract that
underpins the partnership. Table 1 compares the typical accountability environment
under which public-private partnerships are constructed to that under which simple
contracts are constructed. Accountability under a 3P is not necessarily the product
of a hierarchical relationship in which the government agency can define the project
results in advance and sanction the contractor (private partner) for any failure to reach
the desired outcomes. When multiple actors with manifold ties to each other and
different goals are in play, the degree and extent of accountability is best described
as emerging from their multi-stranded interactions.
Simple contracting out works best when there is little inherent project or task
uncertainty. The contract specifies the outcomes and obligations of each party. If
a contractor fails to provide the agreed upon service in the stipulated manner, the
government can sanction the contractor, who is accountable to the government
agency and assumes all risk. The relationship between contractor and government is
an exchange of fee for service, frequently formed after the submission of competitive
bids with only a minimal amount of negotiation of the terms of the contract. Just
as there is little or no sharing of risk, there is little or no sharing of property rights.
Table 1 lists an example of a simple contract—a state government paying a firm to
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Table 1. A comparison of the accountability environment for simple contracting out
and tolling public-private partnership
Accountability Environment for
Contract Development

Simple Contracting Out

Tolling Public-Private Partnership

Degree of project certainty

Higher

Lower

Specificity of contractor
outcomes and obligations

Higher

Combination of specified and
unspecified

Relationship formation

Competitive bidding with
minimal discussion

Discussion and negotiation prior to and
post contract finalization

Ownership of property and/or
income rights

Government

Shared property and/or income rights

Burden of risk for project failure

Contractor assumes
majority of risks

Risk is shared with a range of acceptable
outcomes for multiple parties

Type of accountability

Hierarchical

Emergent

Typical project

Contract for 2-inch overlay
on state highway

Contract for toll road with partner rights
to toll for specified number of years

lay a 2-inch overlay of asphalt on a highway. Employees of the state DOT routinely
inspect the work to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract. If the contractor
fails to make a profit or performs poorly, the contractor suffers the consequences.
The contractor can rarely re-negotiate the terms or ask for more payment.
Public-private partnerships, in contrast, tend to involve work that is less certain,
producing effects that are unpredictable and sometimes undesirable, such as shortfalls
in projected revenue streams. The loss of revenue can ultimately doom a project, as
was the case in the recent bankruptcy of the State Highway 130 project in Texas.
The project, noteworthy for its 85 mph speed limit, lasted just four years into a fiftyyear pact before the concessionaire filed for bankruptcy citing traffic revenues and
usage drastically less than initial projections (Wilson, 2017).
Such outcomes can produce losses for multiple stakeholders. When the government
agency and the contractor enter a relationship, mutual trust, negotiation and discussion
are necessary. In many cases, the relationship exists prior to the signing of the
contract, as the objectives of the project and means used to attain them are jointly
discussed. Often, there is sharing of property rights and income streams between
the parties. Risk too is shared and the government, as in the case of the city of St.
Louis and the runaway football Rams, can suffer financial losses.
3Ps often involve interdependent stakeholders from multiple sectors with diverse
interests and goals (Gray, 1989; Liyanage & Villalba-Romero, 2015). Some goals
are shared (Frey, Lohmeier, Lee, & Tollefson, 2006), but others diverge, which can
increase the risks. Decision making tends to be shared between the parties and the
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distribution of outcomes is a product of negotiation. Therefore, accountability in
public-private partnerships tends to emerge over the duration of the contract as the
parties respond to unforeseen circumstances. Consequently, it is necessary to build
into the contract carefully crafted but flexible incentive structures—specifications
that provide ample room for negotiation (Dewatripont & Legros, 2005; Engel,
Fischer, & Galetovic, 2013).
Accountability tends to emerge through the give and take of negotiation or through
the construction of more elaborate terms in the contract, which can enumerate different
outcomes based on contingencies that may arise over time. Some toll road contracts,
for instance, may reduce contractor risk by allowing the contractor to raise tolls in
the future but with a limit on the absolute size of the toll or the contractor’s profit.
Even with such provisions, forecasting accurate and realistic traffic projections
remain critical to project success. Few cases illustrate the importance better than
the failed 75-year agreement between the State of Indiana and the Indiana Toll
Road Concession Company. With a nearly $4 billion upfront cost, it was estimated
that the concessionaire would need roughly 11 million toll paying vehicles to travel
the turnpike between Chicago and Ohio. Once complete, nearly half as many did
so. The resulting bankruptcy and debt reconsolidation have only compounded the
problems for all involved (Puentes, 2014).
This chapter’s analysis of accountability builds on Gray’s (1989) observation
that collaboration between parties to a contract is needed when the stakeholders
are interdependent and decision-making involves joint ownership, collective
responsibility for future outcomes, and the ability to view accountability as emerging
from negotiation in a constructive work environment. The analysis documents that the
Virginia DOT devised 3P contracts that built in disclosure, feedback, and processes
for collective voice that ensure each stakeholder is able to play a meaningful role
in the lengthy life-cycle of the contract. Of course, the involvement of specific
stakeholders can vary over time (El-Gohary, Osman, & El-Diraby, 2006).
One key to 3P success is the presence of a shared goal, which in this case of
the two 3P projects analyzed in this chapter was the construction of toll lanes that
Virginia drivers would pay to use in future years. Another key to successful 3Ps is
contractual flexibility to ensure that incentives and risks remain balanced over the
life of the contract. The explicit sharing of risk is a key aspect of 3P projects (Hodge
& Greve, 2017), and flexibility in the contract helps to curb financial risk for both
public and private stakeholders, while maximizing public benefit (Schank, 2011).
The flexibility to undo a poorly written contract, “should such undoing become
necessary,” is vitally important for all involved (Boarnet & Dimento, 2004, p. 30).
Prior to construction the parties established a number of agreed upon metrics
which were designed to limit loss to the stakeholders under defined circumstances
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(Dewatripont & Legros, 2005). This creates an ongoing evaluation process that
reassures partners that they can negotiate corrections to handle emergent contingencies
(Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004). Indeed, the two 3P contracts analyzed were very detailed,
containing numerous deadlines, oversight mechanisms, construction and maintenance
standards, reporting requirements, and sanctions for failure to perform along with
dispute resolution procedures including conditions for contract termination or restructuring.

TWO PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CASE STUDIES
The core of this chapter is two 3P case studies of HOV/HOT projects in Northern
Virginia, outside of Washington, D.C. A summary of the two projects is provided
in Table 2.
The Virginia DOT entered into two long-term contracts for the construction of
toll lanes: one with Capital Beltway Express LLC for the I-495 HOT lanes project
and the other with I-95 Express Lanes LLC for the I-95 HOV/HOT lanes project.
The toll roads were managed over the term of the contracts by Fluor-Transurban
Corporation, which paid for the bulk of the construction and was allowed to set and
collect tolls over the long life of the contract—80 years for I-495 and 76 years for
I-95. The private sector partner, referred to in the contracts as the concessionaire,
agreed to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain the facility (a DBFOM
contract) and do so according to the conditions laid out in the contracts. The public
partner, VDOT, for its part, paid 20% of the construction cost for the I-495 project
and 11% for the I-95 project. VDOT was not financially responsible for operation
and maintenance after construction.
Table 2. Summary of the 3P case studies
I-495 HOV/HOT Project

I-95 HOV/HOT Project

Fiscal year approved

2008

2012

Projected/total cost

$2.07 billion

$948 million

Percent of public investment

20%

11%

Miles covered

14

29.4

Contract duration

80 years

76 years

Competing proposals

0

1

Source(s): Amended And Restated Comprehensive Agreement Relating To The Route 495 Hot Lanes in
Virginia Project, 2007; Comprehensive Agreement Relating To The I-95 HOV/HOT Lanes Project, 2012.
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The contracts obligate the concessionaire to operate and maintain the facilities
over the life of the contracts according to a set of standards. In each contract,
there is an agreed upon performance point system that applies five years after the
service commencement date. The Virginia DOT monitors performance and “If
the Department determines any breach or failure…has occurred, the Department
shall…deliver to the Concessionaire written notice thereof describing the breach or
failure in reasonable detail” (section 8.16(iii)). The concessionaire must ‘cure’ the
breach or failure within a specified period of time to remove points and/or avoid
incurring new ones. The contract stipulates that the concessionaire can object to
the determination of a breach and the awarding of points.
The non-compliance performance point system is used as an accountability tool,
albeit, one that may provide a range of divergent outcomes. In either agreement, if
the number of performance points continues to accumulate and/or breaches are not
being cured in a timely manner, several actions may then be taken, starting with
increased departmental monitoring and proceeding to the mandatory development of
a remedial plan. Failure to meet the goals of the remedial plan can result in contract
termination. But the non-compliance performance point system affords flexibility to
each sector and recognizes the inevitability of breaches. Increased monitoring only
occurs after the assessment of 135 performance points during any 365 day cycle
and a remedial plan is only demanded after the assessment of 200 or more points
during any 365 day cycle.
To discourage improper resort to contract termination, damages can be sought
by both the concessionaire and the department depending on the circumstances.
The power to seek damages prevents either party from using the non-compliance
performance point system to void the contract without valid reason.

The I-495 Project
The contract for the I-495 project -- Amended and restated comprehensive agreement
relating to the route I-495 HOT lanes in Virginia project (2007) -- was agreed to on
December 19, 2007 between the Virginia Department of Transportation and Capital
Beltway Express LLC, an entity formed by Fluor and Transurban to design, finance,
construct, and ultimately operate new high-occupancy tolling lanes, designed to
moderate and ease congestion around the nation’s capital.
The project called for the construction of two HOT express lanes in each direction
along 14 miles of Virginia I-495. High Occupancy Vehicles would not pay a toll
when using the HOT lanes. Single occupant vehicles in the toll lanes would pay a
toll that varied by time of day and level of congestion. Thus, toll paying vehicles with
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only a driver and high occupancy vehicles with a driver and passenger(s) could use
the same lanes. This can reduce overall highway congestion as well as congestion
for those who use the un-tolled lanes (Safirova et al., 2003).

Sustainability Goals
This chapter’s focus is on the aspects of the contract that introduce an element
of uncertainty and potential failure that the contract attempts to minimize. The
foremost goal of the I-495 3P project was to provide drivers with a choice of toll
lanes that would provide a free flow operating standard for travel on I-495. The
un-tolled lanes did not have an operating standard and could be congested with
bumper-to-bumper traffic. Free flow would be accomplished with electronic tolling
(with video equipment, transponders, or other technology) and an absence of toll
booths and plazas.
Achieving the project’s goal would also require variable toll fees to closely
regulate driver use of the toll lane so as to meet the free flow standard. When the
highway is congested and free flow is constrained, the toll rate would rise to a
level high enough to divert drivers to the un-tolled lanes. The means to accomplish
this are clearly stated in the contract: The Concessionaire can “establish, impose,
charge, collect, use and enforce the collection and payment of Tolls” (Section 4.01).
The ability to regulate the traffic speed is equally explicit in the contract: “The
Concessionaire shall impose congestion pricing on the HOT Lanes, which may
include dynamic tolling with potential toll rate changes at frequent intervals with a
view to maintaining free flow conditions of traffic, and there shall be no restrictions
on toll rates” (Section 4.04(a)).

Stakeholder Risk Reduction
In addition to HOVs, several other types of vehicles cannot be charged a toll for
use of the HOT lanes. These include mass transit and commuter buses, school
buses, and motorcycles. To reduce the Concessionaire’s revenue risk, the contract
contains this provision regarding the volume of un-tolled HOVs in the HOT lane:
“The department agrees to pay the Concessionaire… amounts equal to 70% of the
Average Toll applicable to vehicles paying tolls for the number of High Occupancy
Vehicles exceeding a threshold of 24% of total flow of all Permitted Vehicles that
are using such toll section going in the same direction for the first 30 consecutive
minutes during any day and any additional 15 consecutive minute periods” (Section
13.05(b)). The complex wording reflects the difficulty of ensuring both free flow
(a government goal) and profitability (a contractor goal).
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The ability to set rates does not assure a net profit for the concessionaire, as it
must maintain a free flow condition and accept a large number of un-tolled vehicles.
If toll prices are too low, it may not be able to maintain free flow. If it raises tolls
too high to obtain free flow, too many drivers may avoid the toll lanes.
The performance point system discussed above ensures a proper balance of
interest between the Concessionaire and the Department. The point system can be
likened to a scorecard, providing an accountability mechanism if the Concessionaire
“breaches or fails to perform its obligations under the agreement”, the Department has
the ability to assess performance points (Section 8.16). The point system measures
Concessionaire performance across the agreed upon metrics of the contract; the
accumulation of non-compliance performance points by the Concessionaire may
further trigger remedies and provisions set forth including but not limited to greater
oversight, additional monitoring, and financial penalty.
Profitability is constrained by two other requirements in the contract. First,
maintenance standards were specified in the contract, which clearly states that
the I-495 HOT lane cannot become a ‘federally degraded facility.’ Second, Fluor/
Transurban had to pay for all aspects of electronic tolling, including administration
and enforcement.

The I-95 Project
The contract for the I-95 HOV/HOT project -- Comprehensive agreement relating
to the I-95 HOV/HOT lanes project (2012) -- was agreed to on July 31, 2012. The
project called for the expansion and conversion of 14 miles of HOV lanes into three
lanes of HOV/HOT lanes. It also extended 9 miles of existing HOV lanes, which
would be tolled. However, as noted with the I-495 project, high occupancy vehicles
would not pay a toll when using the HOT lanes. Single occupant vehicles in the toll
lanes would pay a toll that varied by time of day and level of congestion. Thus, toll
paying vehicles with only a driver and high occupancy vehicles with a driver and
passenger(s) would use the same lanes.

Sustainability Goals
The foremost goal of the project was to provide drivers with a choice of lanes with
an operating speed performance standard (OSPS) of 55 miles per hour. The un-tolled
lanes did not have an operating standard and could be congested with slow-moving
or bumper-to-bumper traffic. This would be accomplished with electronic tolling.
The project would also require variable toll fees to closely regulate driver use
of the toll lane so as to maintain the 55 mph OSPS. When speeds fall below the
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OSPS, the toll rate would rise to a level high enough to divert drivers to the un-tolled
lanes. The means to accomplish this are explicitly stated in the contract: “From
and after the Service Commencement Date and continuing during the Term, the
Concessionaire will have the exclusive right to establish, impose, charge, collect,
use and enforce the collection and payment of the Toll revenues in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement” (Section 5.01(a)). The ability to regulate the traffic
speed is equally clear: “The Concessionaire will impose congestion pricing on the
HOT Lanes, which may include dynamic tolling with potential toll rate changes at
frequent intervals and there will be no restrictions on toll rates” (Section502(a)).
The agreement specifies that the pricing methodology must “be designed to assure
that the Project will meet the OSPS” (Section 5.02 (a)(iii)).

Stakeholder Risk Reduction
While the Concessionaire is empowered to set tolls, it is not guaranteed a profit.
Section 5.07(a) of the contract states: “The Department [of Transportation] will
not have any risk or liability related to actual traffic volume and revenue, including
but not limited to the risk that actual traffic volume is less than the traffic volume
projected in the Base Case Financial Model.”
The Concessionaire’s revenue risk, however, is reduced by a specific contract
provision regarding the volume of un-tolled HOVs in the toll lanes. The contract reads:
“From the period beginning on the second anniversary of the Service Commencement
Date to December 31, 2030 (the ‘First Measurement Period”), the department will
pay the Concessionaire amounts equal to 70% of the Average Toll for the number
of High Occupancy Vehicles exceeding a threshold of 35% of the total flow of all
Permitted Vehicles in two consecutive Toll Sections that are then using such Toll
Sections going in the same direction for any period of 15 consecutive minutes.”
(Section5.07(a)(i)). Similar provisions apply to the other two measurement periods
that complete the 76-year term of the contract. How the 3P contracts analyzed in
this chapter address other risks are discussed next.
In the highly congested Washington, D.C. area, the 55 mph OSPS may not be
possible even with dynamic tolling with variable fee rates. The contract contains
a process to address failures to meet the OSPS. Records of travel speeds are kept
and a monthly report is mandated. The contract states: “the Concessionaire will
notify the Department if the Concessionaire’s scheduled monthly report identifies
any instance of the Project’s failure to meet the OSPS…The notice will describe
such failure in reasonable detail. The Department will notify the Concessionaire
within 30 days of its receipt of the Concessionaire’s report whether or not it requires
an OSPS Improvement Plan” (Section 5.08(a)). The contract further makes clear
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that the plan “will be required to propose a strategy to address the specific reasons
which the Concessionaire reasonably believes caused such failure as described in the
Concessionaire’s report” Section 5.08(b). The state DOT then reviews the submitted
plan and the Concessionaire is required to promptly implement the elements of the
plan that are deemed to be within its control.
The contract does not automatically terminate if the OSPS is not met, but this
may result in the accumulation of non-compliance points should the Department
find the Concessionaire to be in breach of contract. In the event of a breach, the
language calls for a good faith effort to reconcile or cure it; but recognizes the
possibility of failure.
The first OSPS covers the initial 10 years of operation. Every 10 years a new
one is negotiated; this includes the non-compliance performance point system.
However, the contract stipulates that in a subsequent OSPS the 55 mph traffic flow
requirement cannot be raised.

DISCUSSION
Provisions to Counter Risk
3Ps are inherently risky, primarily because of the many and varied interests of
stakeholders. As Roumboutsos and Pantelias (2015) aptly summarize, the contract is
the nexus that merges the multiple interests, and “Paramount in the determination of
this balance of interests is the management of risks and their subsequent allocation
among the various stakeholders” (p. 186).
Summing up, a number of stakeholder interests were addressed in the contracts
but the exact outcomes are far from certain. Government officials and taxpayers
benefit from the greatly reduced cost of construction, maintenance and operation.
The expected reduction in congestion could save drivers time; it could also reduce
air pollution and other environmental costs. Obviously, the drivers who paid the
tolls or rode in high occupancy vehicles expect faster travel and less congestion.
But, even those who choose not to pay the toll may experience some reduction in
congestion when drivers switch to the toll lane. Of course, drivers can avoid the
toll altogether and accept a slower drive. Alternatively, they can use local streets.
Whatever their decision, all drivers benefit in their role as taxpayers, and they can
choose to pay for the toll lane on occasion when time-pressured. The investors
stand to make a reasonable profit so long as a sufficient number of drivers pay the
requisite amount of toll.
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While the taxpayers will save money on construction, the contractor may fail to
adequately maintain the facility over the long durations of the contracts—80 years
for the I-495 project and 76 years for the I-95 project. Moreover, the added toll lanes
may fail to significantly reduce congestion. One potential reason for such a failure
is the fact that the contractor is allowed to set the fee for the toll. Excessively high
fees would impose a high cost for toll lane access and could shunt an excessive
number of drivers into the un-tolled lanes. With greater congestion in the tolled
lanes, there will be little or no net improvement in congestion and therefore, few, if
any, environmental benefits. Allowing single occupancy vehicles to utilize HOV/
HOT lane might reduce the number of HOVs, if drivers abandon carpools and drive
their own vehicles, thereby increasing the number of vehicles on the highway.
As with many 3P projects, the two HOV/HOT lane projects presented significant
revenue-related risks to the private sector. These projects rely on user-based
remuneration (i.e., tolls) which are subject to demand risk (Roumboutsos & Pantelias,
2015). Demand risk reflects the uncertainty in predicted demand, which in the two
cases are associated with traffic volumes and free flow conditions. Addressing the
revenue risk, such as by allowing the private sector flexibility in setting toll rates, is
an important challenge to achieving optimal risk allocation, which is considered the
cornerstone of any successful PPP arrangement (Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015).
Table 3 lists some of the provisions in the contracts that reduce risks to stakeholders
arising from private sector’s right to set toll fees and other concerns. While taxpayers
benefit from the substantial private sector investment and obligation to operate and
maintain the toll lanes, poor construction and maintenance are a possibility along
with little improvement in traffic flow. The contracts addressed these concerns with
clear construction and maintenance standards and a system to address failures to
create free-flow conditions on I-495 and a 55 mph OSPS on I-95. The contract also
contains a very detailed, yet flexible, non-compliance performance point system.
It is designed to ensure timely efforts to cure breaches and failures on the part of
the concessionaire.
The 3P projects offered the environmental benefit of consuming less land and
encouraging free HOV and bus use. Faster travel and less congestion is more likely
with the use of variable rate tolling, which allows for more effective traffic regulation.
The absence of mandatory tolling benefits low income drivers. However, it is possible
that private sector investors would not realize an adequate profit due to toll lanes
failing to attract a sufficient number of toll-paying drivers. Several features of the
contract offer some protection for the private partner—the foremost being the right
to set toll fees and to vary them in response to traffic flow conditions. In addition,
when HOV traffic reaches specified thresholds in the toll lanes, the government
reimburses the concessionaire for HOV use.
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Table 3. Examples of potential stakeholder benefits and losses and contract provisions
to reduce loss
Some Potential
Benefits

Some Potential Losses/
Drawbacks

Taxpayers

Public money saved
on construction and
maintenance

Little change in congestion
and poor construction and
maintenance

Construction and maintenance
standards; OSPS improvement
system

Environmentalists

Fewer miles driven/
reduced pollution;
less land use

No measurable change in
environmental impacts

Fewer lanes added; traffic freeflow; OSPS 55 mph; electronic
tolling

Drivers who use
HOV lane or pay
to use HOT lane

Faster travel; less
congestion

High toll charges; fewer
cars with multiple riders

Traffic free-flow; OSPS 55 mph;
variable fees

Taxpayers who
don’t use tolled
facility

Money saved on
construction and
maintenance/
management

More traffic on local
streets from drivers
avoiding toll road

No reduction in number of untolled lanes; diversion of drivers
to toll lanes

Low income
drivers

No mandatory
tolling

Increased congestion in
toll free lanes; large toll
fees

No mandatory tolling; diversion
of drivers to toll lanes

Private investors

Adequate long-term
profit

Financial loss or low longterm profit; construction of
competing facility by DOT

Payments for heavy HOV usage
of toll lanes; no limit on toll fees;
ability to compete for competing
facility contract

Government
officials

Money saved in
construction costs
and infrastructure
maintenance/
management

Low savings; angry
drivers and voters;
little improvement
in congestion; poor
maintenance

Driver choice of un-tolled
lanes; free-flow and OSPS 55;
maintenance standards; noncompliance performance point
system; ability to terminate for
failure to meet standards

Stakeholders

Examples of Contract
Provision to Reduce Loss

Protection against demand risk also come in the form of restrictions to competition
such as when the 3P project can be considered a natural monopoly or in cases where
a quasi- or temporary monopoly is created through the contractual arrangement
(Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015). However, this risk to the private sector can come
at a cost to public stakeholders who are forced into fewer options. Furthermore,
the public sector seeks to minimize the likelihood of opportunistic behavior of the
private partner (van Den Hurk & Verhoest, 2017).
To protect the public interest, the state of Virginia retains the right to build a
competing facility to handle traffic congestion in the region. In recognition of the
potential impact of this on the concessionaire’s revenue, the contract states that the
concessionaire can bid for the new highway project. This provision, which calls
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for fair treatment, is not unusual, as non-compete clauses have been phased out of
recent 3P contracts due to their tendency to handcuff the public sector for the long
term of the contract (Holeywell, 2013).

CONCLUSION
Public-private partnerships offer a way for resource-strapped government agencies
to meet the needs of multiple stakeholders (Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007). In this
chapter, we focused on contract provisions related to partner risks and incentives, two
aspects of 3P contracts identified by Dewatripont and Legros (2005) as most critical
to 3P success. In optimal 3P agreements, the contract contains provisions to properly
balance the risks and rewards for the public and private sectors, while attending (to
the extent possible) to those of other stakeholders (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004). With
increasing frequency, 3Ps have been used to fund large-scale infrastructure projects
(Bennett & Iossa, 2006; Grout, 1997). Frequently, 3Ps save money by ‘bundling’
service provision (Hart, 2003). Virginia DOT did so by tying construction, operation,
and maintenance into each contract. With bundling, the public sector is able to limit
budgetary strain (Engel et al., 2013).
However, electronic tolling technologies make it possible to pursue environmental
benefits as well. Along with improvements in traffic flow, sustainable transportation
projects can solve some of the social, financial, and ecological problems of urban
community life. In this respect, sustainable transportation often focuses less on city
growth and more on integrating transportation into current urban development,
thereby consuming less land (Leuenberger, Bartle, & Chen, 2014). The 3Ps discussed
in this chapter illustrate a more sustainable approach to congestion management by
introducing HOV/HOT lanes and incorporating congestion pricing. The Virginia
DOT avoided resorting to the traditional solution for traffic congestion—expanding
traffic capacity through construction of many more additional lanes. In pursuit of
sustainability, Virginia constructed fewer lanes, spent far less taxpayer money, and
continued to encourage carpooling and bus transit.
Due to the array of stakeholder interests addressed in the 3P contracts and the
unpredictability of long term returns from the tolling lanes, the exact outcome for each
Virginia stakeholder is difficult to predict. To foster accountability, the contractual
provisions promote discussion and negotiation over the course of the partnership.
The Virginia 3Ps demonstrate that it is possible to build constraints into the contract
to reduce losses and promote a range of acceptable outcomes. The non-compliance
performance point system, for instance, attempts to provide recourse for the public
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in the event of a private sector breach of contract or failure to maintain desired
performances. But it is accommodating, allowing for much discussion and creative
negotiation within stated parameters, the hallmarks of emergent accountability
Of course, many of the devices used in these contracts apply to simple contracts
as well as to the more complex conditions associated with public-private partnerships
for tolling. For example, the contract contained detailed specifications for the new
toll lanes and technologies along with an oversight role for the DOT to ensure
proper materials and desired construction quality. But many of the provisions
laid out in the contract were less specific and were meant to balance the needs of
various stakeholders in ways that implicitly accept a range of outcomes over the long
term. Still, despite the uncertainties involved over the many years of the contracts,
Virginia’s stakeholders appear to like this type of contract. Since the I-495 and I-95
HOV/HOT projects were begun, four additional HOT/HOV projects have been
introduced, albeit not all are 3Ps.
Despite the positives of bundling service provision, leveraging private assets, and
utilizing technology in a manner that promotes environmental sustainability, there
are several reasons for caution. Given the scope of this research, examining two case
studies within the same state, it is impossible to draw firm generalizable conclusions
that may apply across the state and country. Each contract is unique, the needs of
the locality and state vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; yet what the cases do
reveal is how nuanced each situation and agreement is. The need for sustainable
infrastructure, the contractual nuance that creates and maintains accountability, and
the importance of shared risk all illustrate key provisions that can be studied and
evaluated across contracts and jurisdictions.
Given their numerous benefits, we expect to see more HOV/HOT tolling projects
in the future. In addition, to reducing reliance on state and local governments for
the funding of new infrastructure, these projects add another layer of financial
sustainability to transportation development by reducing reliance on the motor fuel
tax, which in this era of fuel efficient and electric vehicles, is producing increasingly
inadequate revenue for road building and maintenance (Chen, (2014). And they
reduce the overall environmental harm of fossil fuel consumption by increasing
the cost of driving, resulting in more use of transit and fewer miles driven in single
occupancy vehicles (Bartle & Devan, 2006; Black, 2010; Leuenberger & Bartle, 2009;
O’Connell & Yusuf, 2013; Wachs, 2003; Yusuf, O’Connell, & Abutabenjeh, 2011).
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Capital Beltway Express LLC: An entity formed by Fluor and Transurban to
design, finance, construct, and ultimately operate the I-495 high-occupancy tolling
lanes, designed to moderate and ease congestion around the nation’s capital.
Contracting Out: Is a means of delivering public services and/or performing
public functions where the government provides compensation to an outside party
in exchange for a defined set of services or functions. Also known as outsourcing.
Emergent Accountability: The flexible accountability mechanisms built into
the contractual agreements to provide recourse and contingencies that ensure a fair
and equitable process for all involved parties.
Express Lanes: Express Lanes are specially-designated highway lanes that
allow drivers to choose to pay a toll to use the lanes and that are free to carpools,
motorcycles, vanpools and other eligible vehicles during the designated hours
of operation. Express lanes operate under the premise of reducing congestion by
incenting and rewarding desired behaviors and/or those willing to pay a toll.
Fluor-Transurban: A principal parties in the I-495 and I-95 roadway projects.
Fluor Corporation provides services on a global basis in the fields of engineering,
procurement, construction, operations, maintenance and project management.
Transurban Group is an international toll road investor and manager with more than
10 years of experience developing and operating complex toll road infrastructure.
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High Occupancy Toll (HOT) Lanes: Lanes accessed by vehicles with multiple
occupants and charged a fee for use (especially at high traffic times) to encourage
carpooling and a less congested route for the drivers while also reducing congestion
on alternative routes. A form of transportation demand management that reduces
congestion through dynamic tolling practices.
High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) Lanes: HOV lanes refer to high occupancy
vehicles. HOV lanes reduce congestion by promoting carpooling and ridesharing
practices. Lanes accessed by vehicles with multiple occupants (especially at high
traffic times) to encourage carpooling and ridesharing, and to reduce congestion.
A form of transportation demand management.
I-95 Express Lanes LLC: An entity formed by Fluor and Transurban to design,
finance, construct, and ultimately operate the I-95 high-occupancy tolling lanes,
designed to moderate and ease congestion around the nation’s capital.
Public-Private Partnership (3P): A partnership between a government agency
and the private sector in the delivery of goods or services to the public. P3s have
been widely implemented in the U.S.A. and across the world for services and
infrastructures related to transportation, social services, and waste disposal.
Tolling: A form of road pricing in which a fee is assessed for use of the tolled
facility.
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT): The Virginia Department
of Transportation is the state agency for the Commonwealth of Virginia (USA)
with the primary responsibility for building, maintaining, and operating the roads,
bridges, and tunnels in the state. For transportation-related P3s in the state, VDOT
represents the interests of the Commonwealth.
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